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 Sexual Orientation 

  * I would like to thank the editors of this book and Phillip M Ayoub for their very helpful comments 
on previous draft s of this chapter. Needless to say, all errors remain mine. 
  1  Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employ-
ment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16 (Framework Equality Directive, FED). 
  2  It should be noted that for ease of reference the umbrella terms  ‘ EU ’ and  ‘ EU law ’ will be used 
throughout this chapter, even when referring to periods preceding the establishment of the EU when 
the matters of equality were addressed as pertaining to the competence of the E(C)C. 
  3  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016] OJ C202/393. 
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 Th e Impact of the Framework Equality 
Directive on the Protection of LGB 
Persons and Same-Sex Couples from 
Discrimination under EU Law 
 alina  tryfonidou * 
 I. Introduction 
 Th is chapter aims to assess the impact of the Framework Equality Directive 2000 
(Directive 2000/78) 1 on the protection of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) individ-
uals and same-sex couples from discrimination under European Union (EU) law. 2 
Th e analysis will begin by explaining that until the adoption of the Framework 
Equality Directive (FED) 2000, the only steps that the EU took for the protection 
of the rights of LGB persons and same-sex couples consisted of soft  law measures 
which, as such, lacked teeth. In addition, unlike discrimination on the grounds 
of gender reassignment, discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation was 
held by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) not to be included in the prohibition 
of discrimination on the grounds of sex and, hence, the various EU law provisions 
prohibiting the latter could not be applied to assist LGB individuals. Th e chapter 
will then analyse the Framework Equality Directive 2000, demonstrating how it 
has improved the position of LGB persons and same-sex couples under EU law 
but also highlighting its shortcomings. Moreover, it will be considered whether 
the gaps in protection left  by the Directive are satisfactorily fi lled by other instru-
ments, in particular by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) 3 which, 
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  4  Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation COM (2008) 426 (Proposal 
for Equality Directive). Th is was accompanied by a Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. Non-Discrimination and Equal Opportunities: A renewed commitment, 
COM (2008) 420. 
  5  For an excellent account of the history of the gay rights movement in the US, see  L  Faderman ,  Th e 
Gay Revolution:  Th e Story of the Struggle ( New York ,  Simon  & Schuster ,  2015 ) . 
  6  Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal ,  App no 33290/96  ( ECtHR, 21 December 1999 ) , para  28 
(sexual orientation). 
  7  Eg Arts 3 (freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment), 8 (right to private and 
family life), and 12 (right to marry) ECHR. 
  8  Th e European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty, the European Economic Community 
(EEC) Treaty, and the European Atomic Energy (Euratom) Community Treaty. 
in Article 21, prohibits discrimination on,  inter alia , the grounds of sexual orien-
tation. Finally, it will be examined whether other legal instruments potentially 
coming into force in the future will be able to cover these gaps. Specifi cally, the 
proposed Equality Directive, 4 which is currently in a state of legal limbo, will be 
considered. Apart from a detailed analysis of the FED and other relevant legisla-
tion, the chapter will also critically assess the judgments by the CJEU that off er an 
interpretation of the above instruments. 
 II. LGB Rights under EU Law before the Introduction 
of the Framework Equality Directive 
 Th e recognition of gay and lesbian rights only began in the 1970s, following the 
awareness raised by the Stonewall riots in New York in June 1969 and the vocali-
sation of the concerns of the gay and lesbian community through the activities 
of early gay rights organisations. 5 Nonetheless, gay and lesbian rights as a new 
 ‘ genre ’ of human rights found their place in human rights protection much later 
and usually as a result of purposive judicial interpretation rather than the amend-
ment of human rights instruments to make explicit reference to them. 
 Th us, the Council of Europe ’ s European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
did not  – and still does not  – include any reference to gay and lesbian rights. 
Similarly, the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14 does not make explicit 
reference to sexual orientation as a protected ground. Nevertheless, the Strasbourg 
Court has held that sexual orientation is covered by the open  ‘ or other ground ’ 
clause in this provision. 6 Moreover, the Court ’ s jurisprudence has revealed that a 
number of other ECHR provisions can be employed either alone or in combina-
tion with Article 14 ECHR to vindicate the human rights of LGB persons. 7 
 Similarly, the founding Treaties of what later became the EU (ie the 
three Community Treaties) 8 made no reference to fundamental human rights, 
let alone to LGB rights. Th is does not appear surprising, given that some of the 
founding states of the EU and the Council of Europe maintained a criminal 
Th e Impact of the FED on the Protection of LGB Persons 231
  9  Th is was the case in Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Norway. 
  10  See, eg  PM  Ayoub and  D  Paternotte ,  LGBT Activism and the Making of Europe ( Hampshire , 
 Palgrave Macmillan ,  2014 ) . 
  11  European Parliament Resolution on sexual discrimination at the workplace [ 1984 ]  OJ C104/46 . 
  12  European Parliament Resolution on the rise of fascism and racism in Europe [ 1986 ]  OJ C141/461 ; 
 European Parliament Resolution on violence against women [ 1986 ]  OJ C176/73 . 
  13  European Parliament Resolution on a plan of action in the context of the 1991 – 1992  ‘ Europe 
against AIDS ’ programme [ 1991 ]  OJ C158/54 . 
  14  K  Waaldijk and  A  Clapham (eds),  Homosexuality:  A European Community Issue  – Essays on 
Lesbian and Gay Rights in European Law and Policy ( Dordrecht ,  Martinus Nijhoff  ,  1993 ) . 
  15  European Parliament, Report of the Committee of Civil Liberties and Internal Aff airs on equal 
rights for homosexuals and lesbians in the EC (26 January 1994) A3-0028/94. 
  16  Roth Report (n 15). 
  17  ibid para 2. 
provision prohibiting sodomy (ie male-to-male consensual sex) at the time that 
both of these organisations were conceived. 9 Nevertheless, tentative steps towards 
protecting the rights of this segment of the population had already been taken by 
the EU in the 1980s. Admittedly, until 1999, all such initiatives were confi ned to 
soft  law measures. 10 
 Th e very fi rst of these soft  law measures was taken in 1984, when the 
European Parliament adopted a resolution on sexual discrimination, inviting the 
Commission to propose legislation on combating discrimination of homosexual 
persons in access to employment. 11 Two further resolutions were adopted in 
1986  – one on fascism and racism in Europe and one on violence against women  – 
both mentioning sexual orientation as relevant to acts of intolerance. 12 
 Th e following decade saw the adoption of a European Parliament resolu-
tion on a plan of action in the context of the 1991 – 1992  ‘ Europe against AIDS ’ 
programme, which stressed the need to include gay men in preventive meas-
ures against AIDS. 13 Th ere were, also, actions which sought to raise awareness 
of the issues aff ecting the gay and lesbian community, the best example being 
an EU-funded project which considered the impact on lesbians and gays of the 
completion of the European internal market. 14 In 1994, the European Parliament 
Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Aff airs decided to draw up a report  – 
the so-called  ‘ Roth Report ’ 15  – which identifi ed the various problems faced 
by  ‘ homosexuals ’ at the time and called on the Member States as well as the 
EU institutions to take action to remedy them. Among other things, the 
report asked the Commission to present a draft  Council Directive on combat-
ing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in a wide range of areas 
of human life. Th e report also  ‘ affi  rmed ’ the European Parliament ’ s  ‘ conviction 
that all citizens must be treated equally, irrespective of their sexual orientation ’ 16 
and noted that it  ‘ [c]onsiders that the European Community is under the obliga-
tion to apply the fundamental principle of equal treatment, irrespective of each 
individual ’ s sexual orientation, in all legal provisions already adopted or which 
may be adopted in future ’. 17 Th e European Parliament subsequently issued a 
 ‘ Resolution on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians in the EC ’, which was 
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  18  European Parliament Resolution on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians in the EC [ 1994 ] 
 OJ C61/40 . 
  19  ibid . 
  20  European Commission, A code of practice on measures to combat sexual harassment, Annex to 
the Commission Recommendation on the dignity of women and men at work [ 1992 ]  OJ L49/1 . 
  21  Regulation  781/98 amending the Staff  Regulations of Offi  cials and Conditions of Employment of 
Other Servants of the European Communities in respect of equal treatment [1998]  OJ L113/4 . 
  22  Case C-13/94  P v S and Cornwall City Council  EU:C:1996:170 . For comments, see  L  Flynn , 
 ‘Annotation of Case C-13/94,  P v S and Cornwall County Council , Judgment of the Full Court of 
30 April 1996, [1996] ECR I-2143 ’ ( 1997 )  34  Common Market Law Review  367 ;  R  Wintemute , 
 ‘ Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination :  Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress 
Codes ’ ( 1997 )  50  Modern Law Review  334, 339 – 344 . 
  23  Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
 conditions [1976] OJ L39/40. 
  24  Case C-249/96  Grant v South-West Trains  EU:C:1998:63 . For comments, see  KA  Armstrong ,  ‘ Tales 
of the Community :  Sexual Orientation Discrimination and EC Law ’ ( 1998 )  20  Journal of Social Welfare 
and Family Law  455 ;  J  McInnes ,  ‘Annotation of Case C-249/96,  Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South West 
Trains Ltd , Judgment of the Full Court of 17 February 1998, [1998] ECR I-636 ’ ( 1999 )  36  Common 
a (much) watered-down version of the Roth Report. 18 Th is resolution, instead of 
calling on the Commission to present a draft  Directive prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the grounds of sexual orientation, merely requested it  ‘ to present a draft  
Recommendation on equal rights for  lesbians and homosexuals ’. 19 
 In response to these initiatives, the Commission took a number of similarly 
modest steps. For instance, it included sexual harassment on the grounds of sexual 
orientation in its code of practice on measures to combat sexual harassment. 20 
Similarly, in 1998, the staff  regulations for offi  cials of the European Communities 
were amended to include a clause prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation. 21 
 During this period, the CJEU, was likewise for the fi rst time confronted with 
cases involving LGBT persons. Strikingly, the Court showed itself to be rather reti-
cent in relation to the protection of LGB rights, in contrast to its willingness to 
protect the rights of trans persons. 
 Th e fi rst case that reached the CJEU  –  P v S and Cornwall [1996] 22  – involved 
a male-to-female trans person who sought to rely on EU law to challenge the deci-
sion of her employer to dismiss her as a result of her decision to undergo gender 
reassignment surgery. Given that, in the mid-1990s, only discrimination on the 
grounds of sex and nationality was prohibited by EU law, the claimant argued that 
the contested dismissal amounted to discrimination based on sex. Since dismissal 
falls within the scope of  ‘ working conditions ’, it was argued that the discrimina-
tion complained of amounted to a breach of the Equal Treatment Directive 1976 
(Directive 76/207). 23 Th e Court was receptive to these arguments, holding that 
discrimination on the grounds of gender reassignment amounts to discrimination 
on the grounds of sex and is thus contrary to EU law. 
 Shortly aft er this ruling, in  Grant [1998] 24 the Court was called on to decide 
whether the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex also included 
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Market Law Review  1043 ;  M  Bell ,  ‘ Shift ing Conceptions of Sexual Discrimination at the Court of 
Justice: from  P v S to  Grant v SWT ’ ( 1999 )  5  European Law Journal  63 . 
  25  Namely, Council Directive 75/117/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women [1975] OJ L45/19 and 
Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions 
[1976] OJ L39/40. 
  26  Case C-249/96  Grant (n 24) para 27. 
  27  Flynn (n 22) 382; Wintemute (n 22) 347 – 348; McInnes (n 24) 1049 – 1050. 
  28  Case C-249/96  Grant (n 22) para 35. 
  29  Th e CJEU followed the same approach in  Joined Cases C-122 and 125/99  P D and Sweden 
v Council  EU:C:2001:304 . 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or, if not, whether the latter 
form of discrimination was prohibited by EU law at the time. Th is case involved a 
lesbian employee of South-West Trains (in the UK) who was refused travel conces-
sions for her (long-term) female partner, although her (male) predecessor in the 
post did receive these concessions for his (long-term) female partner. Ms Grant 
claimed that this amounted to (direct) discrimination on the grounds of sex 
prohibited by EU law relying on the requirement of equal pay for equal work in 
Article 119 EC (now Article 157 TFEU) and the directives on equal treatment of 
men and women. 25 
 However, Grant ’ s argument was not accepted by the Court. In relation to the 
claim that the contested refusal amounted to discrimination on the grounds of 
sex, the Court employed the  ‘ equal misery ’ argument, comparing Ms Grant with 
a (hypothetical)  male employee claiming the same concessions for his ( male ) 
 partner. 26 Th is methodology has been widely criticised in the literature for using 
the wrong comparator. Th e correct comparator would have been a male colleague 
with a  female partner, since, in this way, the  only characteristic changed in the 
comparison is the sex of the claimant, whereas under the comparison drawn by 
the Court, both the sex of the claimant  and the sex of the partner were changed. 27 
Th e Court then pointed out that: 
 in the present state of the law within the Community, stable relationships between 
two persons of the same sex are not regarded as equivalent to marriages or stable rela-
tionships outside marriage between persons of opposite sex. Consequently, an employer 
is not required by Community law to treat the situation of a person who has a stable rela-
tionship with a partner of the same sex as equivalent to that of a person who is married 
to or has a stable relationship outside marriage with a partner of the opposite sex. 28 
 Finally, the Court noted that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation 
is not covered by the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex. 29 
 III. Directive 2000/78 
 As seen in the previous section, until the promulgation of Directive 2000/78, 
EU law did not grant any protection from discrimination based on sexual 
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  30  For commentary on the steps that led to the introduction of this provision by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, see  M  Bell and  L  Waddington ,  ‘ Th e 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the Prospects 
of a Non-Discrimination Treaty Article ’ ( 1996 )  25  Industrial Law Journal  320 . For comments on 
Article 13 EC generally, see  L  Flynn ,  ‘ Th e Implications of Article 13 EC  – Aft er Amsterdam, Will Some 
Forms of Discrimination be More Equal than Others ? ’ ( 1999 )  36  Common Market Law Review  1127 . 
  31  FED Arts 2 (prohibition) and 3 (scope). 
  32  ibid Art 2(4). 
  33  ibid Art 4. 
  34  ibid Arts 5 and 6 respectively. 
  35  ibid Art 2(2)(b)(i). 
  36  ibid Art 2(5). 
orientation to LGB individuals. Moreover, unlike discrimination on the grounds 
of gender reassignment, discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation was 
held not to amount to discrimination on the grounds of sex. Th us, there was a 
lacuna in the protection of this segment of the EU population. However, this 
gap was fi lled by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which introduced Article 13 EC 30 
(now Article 19 TFEU), stipulating: 
 Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the 
powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously in accord-
ance with a special legislative procedure and aft er obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial 
or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
 Th is provision does not prohibit discrimination on,  inter alia , the grounds of 
sexual orientation but is merely a competence-giving provision which, as such, 
lacks direct eff ect. Accordingly, the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds 
of sexual orientation did not automatically emerge from the insertion of Article 13 
into the EC Treaty, but was only introduced when the EU legislature promulgated 
Directive 2000/78. 
 Th e latter instrument prohibits (direct and indirect) discrimination on the 
grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, in the areas of 
employment, vocational training, and membership of a professional organization. 
It makes clear that harassment based on any of these grounds is a prohibited form 
of discrimination. 31 Similarly, an instruction to discriminate on these grounds is 
unlawful. 32 Furthermore, the Directive makes provision for a general occupational 
requirements exception applicable to all grounds. 33 More specifi c exceptions only 
apply to discrimination on the grounds of disability and age. 34 Indirect discrimina-
tion on any of the grounds laid down in the Directive can be objectively justifi ed. 35 
Th e Directive is also  ‘ without prejudice to measures laid down by national law 
which, in a democratic society, are necessary for public security, for the mainte-
nance of public order and the prevention of criminal off ences, for the protection 
of health and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others ’. 36 Taking a 
substantive equality approach, the Directive facilitates positive action, noting that 
 ‘ the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from main-
taining or adopting specifi c measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages 
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  37  ibid Art 7. 
  38  ibid Art 8. 
  39  ibid Arts 13 and 14 respectively. For a discussion of the role that transnationally connected LGBT 
NGOs play as catalysts in the adoption of legislation protecting LGBT rights, especially in more recent 
EU Member States, see the chapter by Phillip M Ayoub in the present volume. 
  40  Council Directive  2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000]  OJ L180/22 (Race Equality Directive). 
  41  For their material scope, see Art 3 of each Directive. 
  42  Directive 2000/43 (n 40) Article 13. 
  43  D  Schiek ,  ‘A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law ? Directives 2000/43/EC, 
2000/78/EC and 2002/73/EC Changing Directive 76/207/EEC in context ’ ( 2002 )  8  European Law 
Journal  290 ;  M  Bell and  L  Waddington ,  ‘ Refl ecting on Inequalities in European Equality Law ’ ( 2003 ) 
 28  European Law Review  349 ;  E  Howard ,  ‘ Th e Case for a Considered Hierarchy of Discrimination 
Grounds in EU Law ’ ( 2007 )  13  Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law  445 . 
linked to any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 ’. 37 Th e legislation is a mini-
mum harmonisation measure, enabling Member States to introduce or maintain 
provisions which are more favourable than those laid down in it. 38 In addition, 
provision is made for remedies and enforcement, with particular attention on the 
promotion of dialogue between social partners, the encouragement of dialogue 
with appropriate NGOs that have a legitimate interest in contributing to the fi ght 
against discrimination, and the promotion of the principle of equality. 39 
 Th e Framework Equality Directive (FED) is important in that it is the fi rst 
instrument in EU law to establish a binding prohibition of discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation. Yet it has been criticised for not going far enough, 
especially when compared to the instruments prohibiting discrimination on the 
grounds of sex, and racial or ethnic origin. In particular, the protection aff orded 
by the Directive appears to be inferior to that provided by (its sister) Race Equality 
Directive 2000 (Directive 2000/43), 40 which was also adopted on the basis of 
Article  13 EC and promulgated just months before. Admittedly, the material 
scope of application is much more limited for Directive 2000/78  – it only applies 
to employment, vocational training and membership of a professional organisa-
tion, whereas Directive 2000/43 also encompasses social protection (including 
social security and healthcare), social advantages, education, and access to and 
supply of goods and services which are available to the public, including  housing. 41 
Moreover, the relatively large amount of exceptions from discrimination in 
Directive 2000/78 means the categories of persons that fall within its scope are 
less protected than those under Directive 2000/43, which has a more limited scope 
for exceptions. Moreover, the Race Equality Directive 2000 obliges Member States 
to designate a body for the promotion of equal treatment of all persons without 
discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, 42 whereas no such duty is 
imposed by Directive 2000/78. Hence, a number of commentators have criticised 
the current anti-discrimination policy of the EU for creating a hierarchy among 
the various grounds on which discrimination is prohibited, with discrimination 
on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin at the top, and discrimination on the 
grounds of age at the bottom of the hierarchy. 43 
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  44  M  Bell ,  ‘Advancing EU Anti-Discrimination Law: the European Commission ’ s 2008 Proposal for a 
New Directive ’ ( 2009 )  3  Th e Equal Rights Review  7, 9 . 
  45  Case C-81/12  Asocia ţ ia Accept v Consiliul Na ţ ional pentru Combaterea Discrimin ă rii  EU:C:2013:275 
(discrimination by assumption);  Case C-303/06  Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law  EU:C:2008:415 
(discrimination by association). 
  46  Case C-267/06  Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen B ü hnen  EU:C:2008:179 . For a comment, 
see  C  Tobler and  K  Waaldijk ,  ‘Annotation of Case C-267/06,  Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsandstalt der 
deutschen B ü hnen , Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of 1 April 2008, not yet 
reported ’ ( 2009 )  46  Common Market Law Review  723 . 
  47  Case C-267/06  Maruko (n 46) para 67. 
 Unfortunately, such a hierarchical relationship among the various grounds 
makes the law in this area ill-suited for dealing with multiple discrimination, since 
in certain areas (e.g. housing) discrimination on the grounds of racial origin is 
prohibited whilst discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is not. For 
example, if a gay Asian man is discriminated against on grounds of ethnic origin 
 and sexual orientation, he can rely on Directive 2000/43 to challenge the former 
but he cannot rely on Directive 2000/78 to challenge the latter. 44 Finally, neither of 
the 2000 Directives makes it clear that discrimination by assumption and discrim-
ination by association are also prohibited. Nevertheless, this has been established 
by the Court of Justice in its jurisprudence interpreting the directives. 45 
 Th e prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, as laid 
down in the FED, was interpreted by the CJEU through a number of preliminary 
rulings. Th e fi rst such ruling was delivered eight years aft er the promulgation of 
the Directive.  Maruko [2008] 46 concerned a reference from proceedings between 
Mr Maruko and the German Th eatre Pension Institution ( ‘ VddB ’ ) relating to the 
refusal by VddB to recognise Mr Maruko ’ s entitlement to a widower ’ s pension as 
part of the survivor ’ s benefi ts provided for under the compulsory occupational 
pension scheme, of which his deceased registered life partner had been a member. 
Th e refusal by VddB was based on the fact that its regulations only provided for 
such an entitlement for spouses, excluding surviving registered life partners. 
 When considering whether the contested refusal amounted to discrimination 
on the grounds of sexual orientation contrary to Directive 2000/78, the Court 
pointed out that: 
 from 2001 [ … ] the Federal Republic of Germany altered its legal system to allow persons 
of the same sex to live in a union of mutual support and assistance which is formally 
constituted for life. Having chosen not to permit those persons to enter into marriage, 
which remains reserved solely to persons of diff erent sex, that Member State created for 
persons of the same sex a separate regime, the life partnership, the conditions of which 
have been gradually made equivalent to those applicable to marriage. 47 
 Th e Court then summarised the views of the referring court and, without 
providing its own conclusion as to whether registered partnerships are treated as 
equivalent to marriage under German law, stated: 
 If the referring Court decides that surviving spouses and surviving life partners are in a 
comparable situation so far as concerns that survivor ’ s benefi t, legislation such as that at 
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  48  ibid para 72. 
  49  According to Tobler and Waaldijk,  Maruko can be viewed as a  ‘ move away from an approach 
under which only measures that are explicitly based on the prohibited criterion or on a criterion 
that is by nature indissociably linked to it (such as pregnancy in the case of sex) amount to direct 
discrimination. ’   – see Tobler and Waaldijk (n 46) 739 – 740. 
  50  A  Eriksson ,  ‘ European Court of Justice :  Broadening the scope of European nondiscrimination law ’ 
( 2009 )  7  International Journal of Constitutional Law  731, 742 . 
  51  Case C-147/08  R ö mer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg  EU:C:2011:286 . 
issue in the main proceedings must, as a consequence, be considered to constitute direct 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, within the meaning of Articles 1 and 
2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78. 48 
 To put it diff erently, if for a certain purpose (e.g. grant of a survivor ’ s pension) 
 a Member State considers same-sex registered partnerships as equivalent to 
marriage, it must treat them in the same way. If it treats the two types of relation-
ships diff erently,  despite the fact that it considers them equivalent , this amounts to 
direct discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation which is contrary to the 
Directive. Th e  Maruko judgment gave cause for both praise and criticism. 
 Starting with the former, the Court should be commended for taking a prag-
matic approach when determining what type of discrimination is at issue in such a 
case. As noted above, it ruled that on the facts of the case, there was direct discrim-
ination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Since marriage was not available 
to same-sex couples, legislation which limits the availability of a certain entitle-
ment to married couples amounts to (direct) discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation, if said entitlement is refused to a couple who is not married 
(because marriage is not open to it) but has entered into a registered partnership. 49 
Th is fi nding  ‘ renders Maruko remarkable ’. 50 
 On the other hand, the view in Maruko that equality of treatment between 
same-sex registered partners and opposite-sex married persons is only required if 
a Member State considers the two as being in a comparable situation for a specifi c 
purpose has been criticised: by deferring this matter to the Member States, the 
Court was in eff ect leaving same-sex couples to the mercy of the latter. 
 Th e Court followed exactly the same approach in the subsequent case of  R ö mer 
[2011]. 51 At issue in that case was the refusal of the German authorities to adopt for 
former employees, who had entered into a life partnership in Germany with their 
same-sex partners, the same method of calculating the supplementary pension to 
which they were entitled as that which was used for former employees who were 
married to their (opposite-sex) partner. Th e Court held that the Directive precludes 
the use of such a diff erent method of calculating the supplementary pension if  ‘ in 
the Member State concerned, marriage is reserved to persons of diff erent gender 
and exists alongside a registered life partnership ’ which is reserved to persons of 
the same gender; moreover, it found that there is direct discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation because, under national law  ‘ that life partner is in 
a legal and factual situation comparable to that of a married person as regards 
that pension. It is for the referring court to assess the comparability, focusing on 
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  52  ibid, para 52. 
  53  Case C-81/12  Asocia ţ ia Accept (n 45). For excellent commentary on the case, see  U  Belavusau 
 ‘A Penalty Card for Homophobia from EU Non-Discrimination Law :  Comment on  Asocia ţ ia Accept 
(C-81/12) ’ ( 2015 )  21  Columbia Journal of European Law  329 and the chapter by Kristin Henrard in this 
volume. 
  54  Case C-81/12  Asocia ţ ia Accept (n 45) para 36. Th e Court had already held this in relation to the 
prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of race in  Case C-54/07  Centrum voor gelijkheid van 
kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn  EU:C:2008/397 . 
  55  Case C-81/12  Asocia ţ ia Accept (n 45) paras 46 – 53. 
the respective rights and obligations of spouses and persons in a registered life 
partnership, as they are governed within the corresponding institutions, which are 
relevant taking account of the purpose of and the conditions for the grant of the 
benefi t in question ’. 52 
 Th e next case on the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion under Directive 2000/78 was  Asocia ţ ia Accept [2015], 53 which emerged 
from proceedings between Accept, a Romanian NGO which defends and 
promotes the rights of LGBT persons, and the Romanian Council for Combatting 
Discrimination. Th e latter had partially dismissed a complaint lodged following 
public statements made by a person (Mr Becali) who presented himself as having  – 
and was considered by public opinion to play  – a leading role in a Romanian 
professional football club (FC Steaua). Mr Becali had ruled out the recruitment 
by FC Steaua of a footballer alleged as being gay. Consequently, Accept claimed 
that the principle of equal treatment had been breached in regard to recruitment. 
 In its judgment, the Court fi rst pointed out that to establish direct discrimi-
nation on the grounds of sexual orientation, an identifi able complainant who 
claims to have been the victim of such discrimination is not required. 54 Instead, 
it suffi  ces if the claim is brought by an NGO without identifying the person that 
has been harmed by the action forming the basis of the complaint. Th e Court then 
explained that it is not relevant if the statements which amount to discrimina-
tion come from a person who does not have legal capacity to bind or represent 
the club in recruitment matters, when this person is considered by public opin-
ion to have such capacity. Th e fact that the club has not distanced itself from the 
statements concerned is a factor which the referring court may take into account 
when making its judgment. 55 Th e Court also made it clear that discrimination 
 by assumption is prohibited by the Framework Equality Directive 2000. In other 
words, for discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation to be proved, it 
suffi  ces if someone discriminates against a person because  they think that he or she 
is gay, irrespective of the actual sexual orientation of the latter. 
 Th is judgment must clearly be applauded, as the Court demonstrated its will-
ingness to adopt a broad pragmatic approach when interpreting the prohibition 
of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. It seems to have achieved 
substantive rather than merely formal equality, by seeking to ensure that even 
potential obstacles to access to the employment market which are liable to occur 
as a result of the existence of discriminatory measures or practices are prohibited. 
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Th us, the Court ’ s analysis is no longer confi ned to a consideration of whether a 
specifi c person has been discriminated against in comparison to another person 
in similar circumstances at a particular instance. Instead, it more broadly consid-
ers whether a certain practice or action of a person or body is such as to create a 
discriminatory climate against a segment of the population which shares a char-
acteristic which is a prohibited ground of discrimination under the Directive. 
Moreover, the Court ’ s approach in  Asocia ţ ia Accept demonstrates its desire to be 
sensitive to the specifi c considerations that pertain to minorities in general, 56 and 
LGB individuals in particular (namely, that they may not wish to  ‘ come out ’ by 
bringing an action claiming that they have been the victims of sexual orientation 
discrimination), especially in Member States where homophobia is still (highly) 
prevalent. Allowing actions to be brought by NGOs in situations without an iden-
tifi able victim is especially important. It ensures that LGB individuals who are not 
 ‘ outed ’ are not faced with the diffi  cult dilemma of either refraining from bringing 
an action to continue hiding their sexuality or to bring an action and thus  ‘ come 
out ’ at a time when they may not be ready or in circumstances that will make them 
suff er negative consequences. 
 Th e same positive approach towards the protection of LGB persons from 
discrimination is evident in the subsequent case of  Hay [2013], 57 with facts quite 
similar to those in  Maruko and  R ö mer . Here, the Court took the opportunity to 
react to the criticisms levelled against its approach in the previous cases by 
conducting the comparability assessment (between same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples) itself, instead of leaving it to the Member States. 
 Th e case involved the refusal by a French bank to award one of its employees, 
Mr Hay who concluded a civil solidarity pact with his male partner, special leave 
and a bonus granted to staff  who marry. Aft er fi nding that the issue related to 
Mr Hay ’ s  ‘ pay ’, the Court decided that Directive 2000/78 was applicable. It then 
proceeded to consider whether same-sex couples who entered into a Pacte Civil de 
Solidarit é (PACS) were in a position comparable to opposite-sex married couples 
as regards the special leave and the bonus, concluding that they are. 58 In contrast, 
in the  Maruko and  R ö mer judgments, the Court merely provided guidelines as 
to how the comparability assessment should be conducted without making the 
assessment itself. 
 In line with  Maruko and  R ö mer , the Court upheld that discrimination against 
same-sex couples who have entered into a form of registered partnership because 
marriage is not available to them amounts to  direct discrimination on the grounds 
of sexual orientation. 59 It noted: 
 Th e fact that the PACS, unlike the registered life partnership at issue in the cases which 
gave rise to the judgments in  Maruko and  R ö mer , is not restricted only to homosexual 
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couples is irrelevant and, in particular, does not change the nature of the discrimination 
against homosexual couples who, unlike heterosexual couples, could not, on the date of 
the facts in the main proceedings, legally enter into marriage ’. 60 
 Accordingly, for a fi nding of direct discrimination it is not necessary that the status 
which is treated worse (here, the PACS) is only open to same-sex couples. Rather, 
what is required is simply that the status through which additional rights or bene-
fi ts are granted (in this case, marriage) is not open to same-sex couples. 
 Overall,  Hay  – in line with  Asocia ţ ia Accept  – can be considered an example of a 
case which has improved the position of LGB persons and same-sex couples under 
EU law, by interpreting the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation broadly, and appearing less hesitant to sanction clearly discriminatory 
actions. Th e Court now seems willing to conduct the comparability assessment 
itself and to determine whether under national law, same-sex registered partners 
are similarly situated with opposite-sex married couples for a particular purpose. 
In case of a positive determination, Member States would be required to extend 
entitlements which they might have preferred to bestow only on married couples 
also to same-sex couples who have formalised their relationships. 
 Th e most recent case concerning the prohibition of discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation under Directive 2000/78 is  Parris [2016]. 61 
Dr Parris, a retired academic, brought an action against Trinity College Dublin 
(his former employer) and a number of Irish government departments, arguing 
that he had been discriminated against by the defendants by reason of his age 
and sexual orientation. Trinity College Dublin had refused to accept Dr Parris ’ s 
request that on his death, the survivor ’ s pension provided for by the occupational 
benefi t scheme, of which he was a member, should be granted to his civil partner. 
Th e refusal was based on the fact that Dr Parris entered into a civil partnership 
with his male partner only aft er he had turned 60 and the occupational scheme 
provided that the survivor ’ s pension was payable only if the claiming member had 
married or entered into a civil partnership before reaching the age of 60. However, 
in Ireland, civil partnerships could only be entered into since January 2011, and 
civil partnerships entered into abroad could be recognised only prospectively from 
January 2011. Th us, LGB persons born before 1 January 1951 (ie LGB persons who 
turned 60 before they could enter into a same-sex civil partnership in Ireland) 
were, in eff ect, excluded in all instances from claiming a survivor ’ s benefi t for their 
same-sex civil partner. Th e main question of the referring court was whether the 
contested rule of the occupational scheme amounted to discrimination on the 
grounds of age and/or sexual orientation, contrary to Directive 2000/78. 
 Th e Court held that the contested rule did not give rise to direct discrimi-
nation on the grounds of sexual orientation because it did not refer directly to 
the worker ’ s sexual orientation. Th e Court also found that the contested rule did 
not give rise to indirect discrimination on these grounds either, as  ‘ the fact that 
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Mr Parris is unable to satisfy that condition is a consequence, fi rst, of the state of 
the law existing in Ireland at the time of his 60th birthday, in particular the absence 
at that time of a law recognising any form of civil partnership of a same-sex couple, 
and, secondly, of the absence, in the rules governing the survivor ’ s benefi t at issue 
in the main proceedings, of transitional provisions for homosexual members born 
before 1951 ’. 62 
 Referring to Recital 22 of Directive 2000/78, the Court proceeded to highlight 
the deference it shows towards Member State laws regarding the regulation of 
marital status in their territory and, in particular, the legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships: these are matters with respect to which Member States have main-
tained their full competence, and thus have regulatory freedom over, provided that 
obligations under EU law are complied with. 63 Th e Court then explained that the 
 ‘ Member States are thus free to provide or not provide for marriage for persons of 
the same sex, or an alternative form of legal recognition of their relationship, and, 
if they do so provide, to lay down the date from which such a marriage or alterna-
tive form is to have eff ect ’. 64 From this, the Court concluded that: 
 EU law, in particular Directive 2000/78, did not require Ireland to provide before 
1 January 2011 for marriage or a form of civil partnership for same-sex couples, nor to 
give retrospective eff ect to the Civil Partnership Act and the provisions adopted pursu-
ant to that act, nor, as regards the survivor ’ s benefi t at issue in the main proceedings, 
to lay down transitional measures for same-sex couples in which the member of the 
scheme had already reached the age of 60 on the date of entry into force of the act. 65 
 Accordingly, the CJEU deemed the contested rule not to violate the prohibition 
of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, laid down in the FED. 
Nevertheless, the contested measure was held to establish a diff erence in treatment 
directly based on the criterion of age, which however fell within one of the excep-
tions provided by the Directive and was thus not prohibited. 
 Finally, the question was raised whether the contested rule gave rise to (multi-
ple) discrimination on the combined grounds of age and sexual orientation. Th e 
Court did not examine this in substance, merely indicating that multiple discrimi-
nation is not prohibited by the FED. 66 
 As argued elsewhere, 67 the judgment can be characterised as a failed oppor-
tunity for the CJEU to off er eff ective protection to LGB persons and same-sex 
couples under EU law. In particular, the  Parris case seems to be treading cautiously 
around matters that are delicate from the standpoint of the Member States. 
Th e Court appears wary of being accused of imposing its own views with regard to 
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a matter (namely, the legal recognition of same-sex relationships) for which there 
is still great diversity of opinion among the Member States. 68 By hiding behind 
Recital 22, the Court avoided intervening in this case. Th e legal recognition of 
same-sex relationships and the derived rights is indeed a matter wholly to be regu-
lated at Member State level. However, the  Parris judgment allows Member States to 
discriminate against LGB persons who are unable to enter into a marriage or regis-
tered partnership in a certain Member State until a certain date. Th ese persons are 
diff erently situated from heterosexual persons who had the (legal) option of enter-
ing into a marriage or registered partnership by the required age, but chose not to 
do so and, thus, should be treated diff erently. 
 As in other areas where the Member States have maintained their full legisla-
tive competence, they must comply with their obligations under EU law when 
making legislation regulating the legal recognition of family relationships (includ-
ing same-sex relationships) and the economic consequences that ensue from 
entering into such relationships. Accordingly, it is not correct for the CJEU in this 
case to simply state that the legal recognition of same-sex relationships is a matter 
that falls to be regulated exclusively by the Member States. Rather, it must ensure 
that Member State rules governing occupational pensions in situations involving 
same-sex couples comply with Directive 2000/78. Such compliance would require 
the removal of discrimination on the (combined) grounds of sexual orienta-
tion and age, without however requiring Ireland to recognise such relationships 
retrospectively  – indeed a matter that falls to be regulated exclusively by Ireland. 
Compliance could be achieved by amending the rule and permitting LGB persons 
born before 1951 to claim the survivor ’ s benefi t for their same-sex partner even if 
they entered into a civil partnership or marriage aft er turning 60. 
 Notwithstanding its rather disappointing approach in  Parris , the Court ’ s inter-
pretation of the Directive in other recent cases has in several respects played an 
important role in improving the position of LGB persons and same-sex couples 
under EU law. 
 IV. Other (Actual or Potential) Sources of 
Legal Protection of LGB Persons and Same-Sex 
Couples from Discrimination under EU Law 
 Th e aim of this section is to consider whether the other (actual or potential) main 
sources of protection of LGB persons and same-sex couples under EU law can fi ll 
the gaps left  by Directive 2000/78. 
Th e Impact of the FED on the Protection of LGB Persons 243
  69  Art 51 CFR. 
  70  Th e Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights ([2007] OJ C303/17) state that 
the Charter is binding on the Member States  ‘ when they act in the scope of Union law ’. Th e most 
recent case-law interpreting Article 51 also adopts a broad reading of this provision:  ‘ Th e applicabil-
ity of European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter ’ 
( Case C-617/10  Fransson  EU:C:2013:105 para 21). However, it is yet to be clarifi ed  when a situation 
falls within the scope of EU law for this purpose. In some of its latest case-law, the Court appears 
 A. Th e EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 Th e Treaty of Lisbon came into force in December 2009. It amended the EU and 
EC Treaties, and changed the name of the latter to  ‘ TFEU ’. In addition, it made the 
EUCFR binding, by providing in Article 6(1) TEU (as amended) that this docu-
ment now has the same legal value as the treaties. Th e coming into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon has been immensely important for the protection of LGB rights 
for a number of reasons. 
 Firstly, the treaty added a new mainstreaming provision  – Article 10 TFEU  – 
which provides that  ‘ [i]n defi ning and implementing its policies and activities, the 
Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation ’. Th is provision proactively 
ensures that all EU policies should now be free from discrimination on,  inter 
alia , the grounds of sexual orientation. Th us, it suitably complements the reac-
tive protection from this sort of discrimination off ered by secondary legislation 
(Directive 2000/78) and by the EUCFR (as will be seen below). 
 Secondly, as noted above, the Treaty of Lisbon made the EUCFR binding. 
Th is means that its provisions  bind the EU institutions, and individuals can bring 
actions against Member States for breaching their rights under the Charter in 
situations that fall within the scope of EU law. As regards LGB individuals, this 
is signifi cant because Article 20 of the Charter states that  ‘ Everyone is equal 
before the law ’. More signifi cantly, Article 21 provides that  ‘Any discrimination 
based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership 
of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or  sexual orientation shall 
be prohibited ’ (emphasis added). Th erefore, LGB individuals can rely on this 
provision to challenge instances of discrimination based on their sexual orienta-
tion even in situations which are not related to employment, vocational training, 
and membership of professional organisations. Put diff erently, the Charter has 
expanded the material scope of the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds 
of sexual orientation. 
 Yet, one should not overestimate the ability of the Charter to protect the rights 
of LGB individuals. Indeed, the Member States are only bound when they are 
 ‘ implementing EU law ’. 69 Since it is still not entirely clear when this requirement 
is satisfi ed, 70 the extent to which this provision can be relied on against Member 
States will be dependent on the Court ’ s willingness to interpret it broadly. 
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  75  Case C-528/13  L é ger (n 71) para 50. 
 Th irdly, apart from Article 21 TFEU, the Charter also includes a number of 
other rights that can be of help to LGB persons, most signifi cantly the right to 
human dignity and the right to private and family life. However, this is not really 
an innovation, since even before the coming into force of the Charter, these rights 
were already protected as general principles of EU law and, could therefore be 
relied on by LGB persons. 
 To date, the Court has only had the chance to apply the Charter in a single 
case involving LGB individuals  –  L é ger 71  – concerning alleged discrimination 
on the grounds of sexual orientation outside the fi eld of employment. Th e case 
considered the compatibility with EU law of the blanket ban in France on blood 
donation by men who have had sex with other men (MSM). It was argued that 
this amounted to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation since 
this category of persons essentially comprised of gay and bisexual men. Th e 
Charter was deemed applicable because the contested French legislation was 
implementing relevant EU secondary legislation. 72 Th us, it was necessary to 
consider whether a permanent ban on blood donation by the MSM population 
is compatible with the fundamental rights recognised by the EU legal order. 73 
Th e Court noted, in particular, that the French legislation  ‘ must respect inter alia 
Article 21(1) [of the Charter]  … according to which any discrimination based 
on sexual orientation must be prohibited. Article 21(1) is a particular expres-
sion of the principle of equal treatment, which is a general principle of EU law 
enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter ’. 74 Th e Court found that the contested ban 
 ‘ may discriminate against homosexuals on grounds of sexual orientation ’, 75 since 
the challenged legislation  ‘ determines the deferral from blood donation on the 
basis to the homosexuality of the male donors who, on account of the fact that 
they have had homosexual sexual relations, are treated less favourably than male 
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heterosexual persons ’. 76 Nevertheless, the measure may be justifi ed if it satisfi es 
the conditions laid down by Article 52 of the Charter. While the CJEU left  it to 
the national Court to make the fi nal decision, it provided detailed guidelines, 
specifi cally pointing out that the national Court must examine whether there 
are measures which can achieve the same aim (a high level of human health 
protection) without requiring the imposition of a complete lifetime ban on blood 
donation by the MSM population. 77 
 As explained elsewhere, the Court ’ s judgment is disappointing. 78 Although it 
found that the measure  ‘ may ’ amount to discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation contrary to Article 21 of the Charter, it proceeded to consider whether 
it is justifi ed under Article 52. Instead, it should have ruled that the measure could 
under no circumstances be justifi ed. Th ere may indeed be some gay and bisexual 
men who engage in risky sexual behaviour through unprotected sex with multiple 
partners. Yet, this is also the case for some heterosexual men and for some hetero-
sexual, bisexual or lesbian women. Accordingly, imposing a blanket ban only on 
gay and bisexual men appears to be unjustifi able. Moreover, the exclusion from 
blood donation applies to  all men who have had sex with other men, even if only 
once in their life. Such a wide extent and duration cannot be justifi ed on medical 
grounds. Indeed, medical advances have made it possible to easily detect a virus 
such as HIV aft er a certain period of time has passed since it has been contracted. 
Th erefore, the contested  blanket ban is unnecessary for ensuring the protection 
of public health. Moreover, the hands-off  approach of the Court leaving it to the 
national Courts to decide on the justifi ability of the measure in eff ect condones a 
national measure based on deep-seated homophobia and on stereotypical miscon-
ceptions about the sexual behaviour of gay and bisexual men. 
 Admittedly, the main reason behind the Court ’ s reticent approach in the 
judgment is likely to stem from its wish not to be seen as interfering in a matter 
which is sensitive from the point of view of the Member States. Th e contested 
measure touches on matters of public health and sexuality, in relation to which 
a wide margin of appreciation is oft en left  to the Member States. Yet, in situa-
tions where there is a clear breach of the fundamental rights of a segment of the 
EU  population   – as was the case in  L é ger  – wishing to keep the Member States 
happy by not interfering with their freedom to regulate sensitive matters is not 
acceptable. 
 Although the Charter does have the potential to complement Directive 2000/78 
by protecting LGB individuals from discrimination outside employment, provided 
that the situation falls within the scope of application of the Charter, the signs 
so far are not very encouraging. Th e Court ’ s political and social considerations 
appear to form an obstacle to protecting the rights of LGB persons. 
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 B. Th e (Proposed) Equality Directive 
 As noted earlier, one of the main weaknesses of Directive 2000/78 is its limited 
material scope, which only covers the areas of employment and vocational train-
ing. Th is gap in protection will be fi lled if the proposed Equality Directive becomes 
law. 79 However, notwithstanding extensive discussion since 2008 regarding the 
substance of the proposed Directive and the amendments to the original proposal, 
there are no signs that unanimity in Council will be achieved any time soon 
(if at all). 
 Th e proposed directive would complement the existing FED by extending the 
prohibition of discrimination therein beyond the employment fi eld to all areas 
covered by the RED. Moreover, the Equality Directive provides for a duty to be 
imposed on Member States to designate a body for the promotion of equal treat-
ment irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, which is 
currently missing from Directive 2000/78. 
 Nonetheless, the proposed directive does not fi ll other gaps in protection left  
by Directive 2000/78. Like the latter instrument, the Equality Directive contains a 
wider range of exceptions from the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds 
of religion, disability, age or sexual orientation than the other instruments regard-
ing the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of gender, nationality and 
race. 80 Moreover, the proposal misses the opportunity to not only cater for multi-
ple discrimination but also to enshrine the CJEU ’ s case law on discrimination 
based on assumption and discrimination based on association as falling under the 
prohibition of discrimination. 
 One may ask why adopting the proposed directive would be important from 
a practical point of view. Aft er all, discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
 orientation is already prohibited in areas outside employment and vocational 
training by Article 21 EUCFR. Indeed, the Charter can help LGB persons who 
are discriminated against either by the EU institutions or by the Member States 
when the latter implement EU law. However, the lack of clarity about interpret-
ing the latter requirement should not be forgotten. A restrictive interpretation 
is possible which considers the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation outside employment and vocational training as applicable only 
in situations where a Member State is implementing EU law. However, by adopt-
ing the proposed directive, the EU will impose an obligation on  all Member States 
to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of,  inter alia , sexual orientation outside 
employment and vocational training. Hence, the uniform protection of LGB 
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persons from discrimination  in all Member States would be ensured. 81 Moreover, 
requiring the promulgation of  national law which will prohibit discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation in a wide range of areas will protect LGB individ-
uals from discrimination in these areas  even in situations that are entirely unrelated 
to, and thus fall outside the scope of, EU law . Finally, since the proposed Equality 
Directive  – like Directive 2000/78  – provides that the prohibition of discrimina-
tion will have to apply  both in the public and the private sectors, LGB individuals 
will be able to rely on the implementing national legislation even against private 
individuals. For instance, if a same-sex couple is refused a hotel room, this will be 
prohibited by national law implementing the proposed directive, allowing for an 
action to be brought against the hotel owners. 
 Th us, and for the reasons summarised above, it is important to ensure that 
the proposed Equality Directive is promulgated soon because it will signifi cantly 
improve the position of LGB persons under EU law and their protection from 
discrimination. Given that Commissioner Frans Timmermans, whose portfo-
lio includes the protection of fundamental rights, has made the passing of the 
proposed Equality Directive one of his priorities, there is reason to feel optimistic 
about the possibility of this instrument becoming law in the next few years. 
 V. Conclusion 
 Overall, the FED, as interpreted and applied by the CJEU, can be deemed a success 
story. As O ’ Cinneide has noted,  ‘ the equality directives have come to exert a signif-
icant  “ destabilizing ” eff ect on structural forms of inequality hitherto accepted as 
 “ normal ” at national level, by opening up new legal avenues for individuals, NGOs, 
trade unions and other organizations to challenge discriminatory practices ’. 82 Yet, 
this does not mean that LGB individuals in the EU now enjoy complete equal-
ity with heterosexual individuals, and that they are free from discrimination in 
all areas of human life. As we have seen, the material scope of the FED is still 
confi ned to employment and vocational training. Consequently, Member States 
are only obliged to have provisions in their legislation which prohibit discrimina-
tion on the grounds of sexual orientation in this context. While in cases which 
fall outside the scope of the Directive, Article 21 EUCFR can come to the rescue, 
this is not a panacea. Unlike the FED, which requires Member States to prohibit 
discrimination on the grounds of,  inter alia , sexual orientation even in  situations 
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involving private bodies and parties, Article 21 of the Charter can only be relied 
on against the EU and against the Member States when implementing EU law. 
Furthermore, the Charter requires the existence of a link with EU law, such as 
Member State discrimination against LGB individuals when implementing 
EU legislation or discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation against 
persons who have exercised their free movement rights. Conversely, the proposed 
Equality Directive requires the Member States to adopt legislation to implement it, 
which would then apply as part of the national legal system in  all situations, irre-
spective of the existence of a link with EU law. Accordingly, the EU legal framework 
which seeks to protect LGB individuals and same-sex couples from discrimination 
will only be complete once the proposed Equality Directive becomes law. 
